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CruMINAL LAw-NEGLIGENT Ho11,ucmE STATUTE-MoroR VEmcLE OPER-

ATOR SuFFERING FROM D1sEASE PRODUCING UNCONscmusNEss-Defendant
suffered a single, sudden attack of dizziness or unconsciousness. He was warned
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by a physician, diagnosing his condition as Meniere's Syndrome,1 that he might
at any time, without warning, suffer another such attack. Defendant worked
for a year and three months without a recurrence. Then defendant ''blacked
out" while driving alone and his automobile crashed into another, causing the
death of its driver. The trial judge convicted2 for statutory negligent homicide.
On appeal, held, affirmed. Defendant's driving on a through state highway8
with knowledge that he might become disabled without warning met the
statutory criterion of driving "carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton
disregard of the rights or safety of others"4 so that he was criminally responsible
for the death resulting. State v. Gooze, 14 N. J. Super. 277, 81 A. (2d) 811
(1951).
The operator of an automobile may incur, in the absence of legislation,
criminal responsibility for all degrees of homicide, 5 as well as for assault and
battery.6 Nevertheless, among the problems produced by the impact of the
motor vehicle on modern society is criminal responsibility for death caused by its
negligent or grossly negligent operator. Common law manslaughter provisions,
of course, do not apply to the ordinarily negligent operator; moreover, juries and
judges have been reluctant to label as manslaughter deaths caused by the grossly
negligent operator.7 Therefore many states have enacted negligent homicide
statutes varying in their requirements of negligence. Some statutes supplement
orthodox manslaughter law by creating a lesser offense which requires ordinary
rather than gross negligence to support a conviction. 8 Other statutes, such as
1 A disturbance of the semi-circular canals of the ear. See MA.LoY, MEDICAL D1cTIONARY FOR LAWYERS, 2d ed., 187 (1951).
2 The fact that a conviction would serve as a basis for revocation of the defendant's
license may have influenced the court. See appendix to appellant's brief, p. 93a, incorporating the trial record.
·
3 A different result might have been reached on a little traveled road. Cf. the workman
Hinging debris from a roof, HoLMEs, ~ CoMMON LAw 60 (1881).
41 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §2:138-9.
5 Generally 99 A.L.R. 756 (1935); for murder see Cockrell v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. 218,
117 S.W. (2d) 1105 (1938).
6 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 P. 165, 53 A.L.R. 231 (1927); 61 C.J.S. §597
(1949).
7 Riesenfeld, "Negligent Homicide-A Study in Statutory Interpretation," 25 CALIF.
L. REv. 1 (1936). For proposed murder legislation see 36 KY. L.J. 138 (1947). Cf. the
guest statute problem, 18 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 319 (1949).
8 E.g., Michigan. People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 (1914), set aside
a manslaughter by auto conviction because gross negligence was not established. In 1921
Michigan pioneered by creating the lesser offense of negligent homicide. The statute
required only ordinary negligence. People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N.W. 97
(1927). See 25 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §28.556; present form is substantially the same,
4 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §750.324. For the effect of contributory negligence see
People v. Clark, 295 Mich. 704, 295 N.W. 370 (1940). Though the language of the
statute does not expressly cover a killing in the commission of an unlawful act, it has been
applied to this situation. People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177, 16 A.L.R.
902 (1921) (driving while intoxicated); but cf. People v. Beauchamp, 260 Mich. 491,
245 N.W. 784 (1932). The states assess varied penalties for homicide by ordinary negligence. See 1 Conn. Gen. Rev. Stat. (1949) §2415 ($250 and/or 30 days).
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that of New Jersey, supplant that segment of the manslaughter law otherwise
applicable to homicide through the grossly negligent operation of a motor
vehicle, by providing a lesser penalty9 for this special situation. Statutes in this
latter group retain the criterion of gross negligence. Indeed, at least one state
has established a mens rea in the shadowy realm between gross negligence
and intent.10 Though the court in the present case tends to equate "willful or
wanton disregard" with gross negligence, it appears that this statutory language
could be construed to require a mens rea above the level of gross negligence. 11
Whatever the defined mens rea may be, it is utilized to measure the pattern
of conduct found in cases like the present: (1) a warning to the defendant of
a condition potentially productive of sudden disability, (2) ignoring of that
warning by defendant's persistence in driving, and (3) occurrence of that disability with resulting death or injury caused by a vehicle out of control. The
question of criminal (or civil) responsibility in every case is whether the warning was of such a character that the ignoring of it12 amounted to the mens
rea denounced by the statute or the common law. Cases involving organic defects
similar to the one at bar seldom arise. A disregard of a warning that defendant
is afflicted with Bright's disease may be civil negligence, affording a basis for
tort recovery by his passengers. 13 A California decision suggests that the ignoring
of many attacks of epilepsy, the most recent being six years before the collision,
demonstrates a mens rea somewhere between gross negligence and intent.14
A disregard of the warning afforded by frequented attacks of vertigo may even
9 In New Jersey the respective imprisonment terms are 3 years (negligent homicide
statute) and 10 years (manslaughter). Cf. 1 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §2:103-6 with
§2:138-5.
lO California's original statutory criterion of ordinary negligence, People v. Wilson, 193
Cal. 512, 226 P. 5 (1924), was altered to "with reckless disregard of, or wilful indifference
to the safety of others," construed in People v. Young, 20 Cal. (2d) 832, 129 P. (2d) 353
(1942), noted in 16 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 103 (1943). After repeal of this statute in 1943,
California has returned almost to mere ordinary negligence. People v. Wilson, 78 Cal.
App. (2d) 108, 177 P. (2d) 567 (1947). Cf. the judicial fluctuation in Mississippi, 20
MISS. L.J. 345 (1949).
11 Massachusetts distinguishes "wilful or wanton disregard of the rights and safety of
others" from gross negligence for the purposes of its orthodox manslaughter provisions.
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 at 400, 55 N.E. (2d) 902 (1944). While
there is little authority for clear demarcation, prior New Jersey cases appear to make such
a distinction. See Eatley v. Mayer, 9 N.J. Misc. 918, 154 A. 10 (1931), affd. 10 N.J.
Misc. 219, 158 A. 411 (1932); Staub v. P.S. Ry. Co., 97 N.J.L. 297, 117 A. 48 (1922);
and Iaconio v. D'Angelo, 104 N.J.L. 506, 142 A. 46 (1928). However, gross negligence
6Ufficed for manslaughter, State v. Blaine, 104 N.J.L. 325, 140 A. 566 (1928). See also
State v. Linarducci, 122 N.J.L. 137, 3 A. (2d) 796 (1939); and State v. Hedinger, 126
N.J.L. 288, 19 A. (2d) 322 (1941).
12 The ignoring of the warning, by driving, is a relatively constant factor. See note
3 supra.
13 Decker v. Everson, 14 N.J. Misc. 860, 187 A. 783 (1936) ( verdict for defendant
upheld on instruction on assumption of risk). There must be warning to the defendant
of his condition. Cohen v. Petty, 62 App. D.C. 187, 65 F. (2d) 820 (1933).
14 People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 110, 142 P. (2d) 435 (1943) (reversed
because defendant's capacity to make a rational choice whether or not to drive was not
submitted to the jury). Cf. Commonwealth v. Irwin, 345 Pa. 504, 29 A. (2d) 68 (1942).
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supply the intent required to support a criminal assault and battery. 15 These
cases and the principal case bear some analogy to the sleeping-at-the-wheel
cases. Proof that a defendant fell asleep during the operation of an automobile
is evidence of negligence, both civil1 6 and criminal,17 if not a prima facie case
of negligence, on the theory that the human mechanism gives warning of
approaching sleep. However, the warning in the sleep cases has an immediacy,
and therefore an urgency, that must distinguish them from the cases involving
organic defects. In the principal case with but a single preceding attack and a
substantial time intervening before the recurrence, can it be said that the ignoring of the physician's warning amounted to a statutory mens rea equivalent at
least to gross negligence?

Bernard A. Petrie, S.Ed.

15 Tift

v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916).
v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432, 44 A.L.R. 785 (1925); John A.
Appleman, "Sleeping at the Wheel," 9 S.D.B.J. 170 (1940).
17 State v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, 160 P. (2d) 427, 160 A.L.R. 508 (1945); see, also,
2 SYRAcusn L. RBv. 399 (1951).
16 Bushnell

